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RATABLE TAKING OF NATURAL GAS
INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of correlative rights of owners of adjacent mineral
interests has come a long way since the case of Barnard v. Monangahela Natural Gas Co.,' where, in a suit to enjoin drainage, the court
said: "What then can the neighbor do? Nothing; only go and do

likewise. He must protect his own oil and gas." Since then the
common law concept of correlative rights has been expanded by

case law and by legislation. One legislatively created correlative right
which severely limits the Rule of Capture' is the concept of ratable
take.'
DEFINITION OF RATABLE TAKE

What is "ratable take?" What does this rather vague term mean?
One eminent authority has said:
Perfect ratability may be defined as the opposite of operation under
the rule of capture, that is, allowing each producer the opportunity to
produce the reserves underlying his properties. Since administrative
agencies have usually not adopted reserve basis allocation factors, the
practical definition of ratability amounts to allowing each producer a
fair opportunity to produce that share of the field reserve which is
proportionate to his well's allocation factor.'
Various state statutes define the term as it is to be applied in the
operation of the particular ratable take statute in each particular
jurisdiction. The Kansas statute' defines ratable take on a "reserve
basis" and gives consideration to such factors as acreage, pressure,
open flow, porosity, permeability, and thickness of pay. The Louisiana
statute' and the Oklahoma statute7 base ratability on "natural flow"
while the North Dakota statute' bases ratability on "open flow."
The Mississippi statute' provides for a "fair and equitable basis ...
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OIL AND GAS REP. 99 (1955).
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to prevent. reasonably avoidable drainage." There is no statutory
definition in Texas or New Mexico. Much discretion has apparently
been left to the respective state regulatory agencies. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma defined "ratable taking" as:
...the proportion which natural flow of gas from wells of one producer bears to amount of natural flow from wells of other producers
from same common source of supply or common reservoir.10
For purposes of this discussion the term "ratable take" is to mean
that the wells which are producing gas from a common non-associated natural gas pool or reservoir shall be produced in such a manner that the owners will ultimately recover their "fair share" of the
reservoir. The factors and methods of determining the proportionate
share of each well is immaterial. We are concerned with whether the
various state agencies have the power to enforce ratable take-however determined-and with the problems which must be considered
in the enforcement of a ratable take program.
The emphasis of this comment is on the production of natural gas.
Some, but not all, of the statements will also be true in regard to
oil and associated natural gas. The problems of these two products
are different, for (a) natural gas cannot be stored while oil can,
(b) there are posted field prices for oil but not for gas, (c) the
Federal Power Commission exerts much more control over gas than
oil, (d) pipeline interconnections are much less common for gas than
for oil, and (e) every oil producer has a market while gas producers
must have a pipeline connection in order to obtain a market of any
consequence for their product.
METHODS OF ACHIEVING RATABLE TAKE

There are two effective ways of achieving ratable take: one is by
control of production through ratable take statutes and proration
of allowables;" the other is by control of the purchase of the produced product through Common Purchaser Statutes which require
pipelines to purchase ratably and without discrimination against any
producers."'
In order to achieve effective ratable take it is believed that interconnection of gas pipeline facilities is almost essential so that a
0
' Republic Natural Gas Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 350, 180 P.2d 1009 (1947).
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-703 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 30, § 42; OKLA.
"KAN.
STAT. tit. 52, S 232.
"E.g. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 30, S 42 (1950); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, S 240 (1941); TEX.
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art. 6049a (1948).
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"swapping" of gas can be achieved. A program of gas swapping
would facilitate the achievment of ratable take much more effectively
than the presently common system which does nothing more than
require that excessively overproduced wells be shut in and that purchasers from those wells seek their supply from underproduced wells
in the field and which may require purchasers from underproduced
wells to allow other purchasers to buy gas from those wells.
Many who are acquainted with the problem believe that posted
field prices for gas will be essential to secure the benefits of swapping
gas within a field to achieve more effective ratable take programs."
However, it should be remembered that the price of gas going
into interstate commerce is subject to the exclusive control of the
Federal Power Commission" under the present version of the Natural
Gas Act." Therefore, the state agencies will either have to continue
to develop their ratable take programs without posted gas prices or
will have to work with the Federal Power Commission to have such
prices set.
It is also worthy of note that oil is governed by state-wide regulations" while gas is largely regulated through field-wide regulation."
An exception to this statement is a recently announced Louisiana
program for state-wide regulation of natural gas production."
CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF RATABLE TAKE STATUTES

In 1932 a federal district court held the Texas Common Purchaser Act invalid in Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n.'

The reasons given were that the act burdened interstate commerce
and that it impaired the prior contractual obligations of the interstate pipeline purchasers and took property rights without due
process. Even though this case has not been expressly overruled, it
no longer appears to be the law. A recent United States Supreme
Court case'" upheld a similar Oklahoma statute," rejecting the same
contentions which had been deemed controlling in the Texoma case.
The state commissions are of the opinion that they do have the
1354 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL 69 (September 5, 1955).
"Natural Gas Pipline v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955).
"52 STAT. §§ 821-833 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w.
"E.g.,
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a(S) (1948).
7
' E.g., ibid at Art. 6049a(8)(aa). Also see Col-Tex. Refining Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
150 Tex. 340, 240 S.W.2d 747 (1951).
"Statewide Order No. 29-F (La. Dept. of Conservation 1955), 5 OIL AND GAS REP. 474.
"Texoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 59 F.2d 750 (W.D. Tex. 1932)
(three judge constitutional court).
20Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
21 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52,

§§ 233, 240

(1941).
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authority to order ratable take and ratable purchase of natural gas.
Therefore, the major constitutional problem of the present in this
area is neither the Due Process Clause nor the Impairment of Contracts Clause. It is, rather, the question of how far the Federal Government preempted this field by the passage of the Natural Gas
Act' under its power over foreign and interstate commerce. One
important aspect of this problem is the potential jurisdictional conflict between the Federal Power Commission's requirement of dedicated reserves for interstate pipelines and the state boards' power to
disregard or change the contracts dedicating such reserves under an
exercise of the states' police power. Needless to say, the Federal Power
Commission could foil any state program of ratable take by asserting superior federal power and refusing to allow the states to interfere with such contracts. However, the Natural Gas Act expressly
left control over production to the states. " Therefore, so long as the
states allow the production of enough gas to meet market demand,
it is reasonable to expect that the Federal Power Commission will do
nothing to interfere with ratable take programs designed to protect
the correlative rights of all producers. If, however, the state reduces
allowables beneath the amount needed to meet market demand, we
can anticipate a state-federal conflict in which the states will lose.
Then, too, there is the possibility that the Federal Power Commission
will object to state regulations (under ratable take programs or
otherwise) which require producers who have dedicated their reserves to interstate pipeline companies to sell to other purchasers.
This requirement was placed in the Henze Field Order;4 it is also
present in the Blue Basin Field Order which provides that:
... any distributor, transporter, or purchaser of gas in the field who
has had wells underproduced and whose market demand is such that

the underproduction cannot be made up prior to the next balancing
date must allow any other distributor, transporter, or purchaser in the
field to connect to any or all of the underproduced wells and to purchase gas from said wells for a sufficient length of time to insure that
all underproduction is eliminated."

The reason for such an objection is, of course, that such sales would
tend to deplete the reserves more rapidly and would tend to make the
dedicated reserve requirement for interstate pipeline certificates meaningless.
22

52 STAT. 821-33,

15 U.S.C.

§§ 717-717w.

52 STAT. 821 (1938), I U.S.C. § 717.
244 OIL AND GAS REP. 1846 (Tex. Railroad Comm'n 1955).
2 5 OIL AND GAs REP. 1100 (Tex. Railroad Comm'n 1956).
23
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OF ENFORCEMENT

There are a number of effective methods which have been, or
may be, used to enforce ratable take programs. The most common
of these is the cutting of allowables of producers who overproduce
their wells.2" A stricter sanction can be used where the operators
continue to overproduce their wells, even after cutting of their
allowables; this is the shutting down of either individual wells" or
entire fields.2" An effective sanction to force interstate pipeline
purchasers to observe the Common Purchaser Acts is the power to
forfeit the charters of domestic companies" or the permits to do
business of foreign corporations"° which violate ratable take orders.
Financial penalties can, of course, be used to punish violators of valid
ratable take or ratable purchase orders.3' In extreme cases, where
the offender shows no regard for the milder sanctions, receivership
proceedings can be instituted."2
COMPETING RIGHTS

There are a number of competing rights which must be considered in the adoption of any comprehensive program which would
set production allowables in order to achieve ratable take. There is
the right of the mineral owner to have his oil and gas produced
and to receive payment for it, and there is the right of the lessee
to produce his leases at a rate and price which will give him a reasonable return on his investment.
The state, too, has an important right. It is the right to insist that
the minerals be produced without waste and in such manner as to
maximize efficient recovery. The state must protect the larger right
of the public, both present and future, to have its natural resources
conserved and used economically. The consumer has the ultimate
right. He must be allowed the right to obtain the fuels which he
needs when he needs them and at a reasonable price.
This comment will tend to overemphasize the right of the mineral
owners and lessees to their proportionate share of the market so that
they may share in the profits of the industry. Ratable take schemes
2 See the Field Orders discussed infra.
27Ibid. See also Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62

(1948); Choctaw

Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, -Okla.-,
295 P.2d 800, 5 OIL AND GAs REP. 1226
(1956).
8 Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 59 F.2d 750 (W.D. Tex. 1932).
29
E.g., Tnx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § Ila (1949).
30
E.g., Ibid at
I Ib.
31E.g., ibid at 5 11.
32E.g., ibid at § illf. See also Patton v. Texas, 62 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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are developed for their benefit, but it is to be hoped that they will
not be developed at the expense of these other competing rights.
REVIEW OF CASES

Since there have been very few cases on the problem of ratable
take of natural gas, the most important will be briefly discussed.
The Texoma case" and the Peerless case34 have already been discussed. In the Peerless case the United States Supreme Court also
upheld the orders of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission which
set a minimum wellhead price on gas. It should be noted that the
Peerless case is no longer the law in regard to state control over the
price of natural gas. As pointed out in Natural Gas Pipeline v.
Panonta Corp.,3 such sale is now subject to the exclusive regulation
of the Federal Power Commission because of the Natural Gas Act.
A predecessor to the Peerless case, Republic Natural Gas Co. v.
Oklahoma,3" anticipated the Peerless holding regarding the constitutionality of ratable take by giving an indication of how the United
States Supreme Court felt. In that case the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission, acting under statute, made an order requiring a producer which owned a pipeline to a market to receive into its pipeline
the same proportion of gas from the well of a producer who had no
pipeline, or, in the alternative, to shut down its own wells. The majority of the court felt that the order lacked finality and was not
yet reviewable. Justices Black, Murphy, and Burton dissented. They
wanted the court to decide the case on its merits and stated that
they felt that the order was valid.
An early Oklahoma Supreme Court case held valid a gas proration order which declared the petitioner to be a common purchaser and required it to give pipeline facilities to certain unconnected gas wells and to commence
proportionate and ratable taking of natural gas.., so as to result
in the taking of that ratable proportion that such production bears to
the total production available for market."
...

This was done over the petitioner's argument that to do so would
violate the Impairment of Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution.
An early federal case held that the Oklahoma Common Purchaser
33 Supra, note 28.

" Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
33349 U.S. 44 (1955).
36334 U.S. 62 (1948).

"7Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. Oklahoma, 161 Okla. 104, 17 P.2d 488

(1932).

SOUTHWESTERN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

Act does not apply to practically exhausted fields where the only
producing wells are located in isolated pockets. "

Anderson-PrichardOil Corp. v. Corporation Comin'n shows some
of the factors which a state commission may consider in issuing its
ratable take proration orders. There the court said:
The order... fixing allowables for wells producing gas from a common source of supply, based upon the wells' natural flow, determined
under factors including acreage underlying a lease, thickness of producing formation and porosity, which allocations are shown to be reasonable and equitable, and made to prevent waste, protect the interest
of the public in a natural resource, and the rights of owners of gas
produced from the common reservoir, is sustained under the police
power of the State; the order does not deprive appellants of their property rights... or deny them the equal protection of the law....
Other cases concerned with ratable take include Republic Natural
Gas Co. v. State, defining ratable take and holding that a Corporation Commission order was not arbitrary; Choctaw Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n," shutting in a producer's wells where the producer had not been complying with ratable take orders; and ColTex Refining Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, pointing out that the Texas
Common Purchaser Act is statewide in regard to oil but only fieldwide in regard to natural gas.
REVIEW OF RECENT FIELD ORDERS

REQUIRING RATABLE TAKE

Six of the recent field orders which require ratable take of natural
gas will be briefly discussed herein. Before discussing those orders
it would be well to mention the normal procedure for determining
market demand in Texas. The natural gas producers file forecasts (indicating the amount of gas they plan to produce and sell) and the
purchasers file nominations (indicating the amount of gas they plan to
buy and transport). The nominations are normally disregarded by the
Railroad Commission, the allowables being based upon the pro-

ducers' forecasts which are adjusted for previous differences between
forecasts and actual production; i.e., if a producer takes less than
he forecasts, his future forecasts are decreased in determining his
"Nowata County Gas Co. v. Henry Oil Co., 269 Fed. 742 (8th Cir. 1920).
30Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 207 Okla. 686, 252 P.2d 450,
2 OIL AND GAS REP. 234 (1953).
4"Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 198 Okla. 350, 180 P.2d 1009 (1947).
295 P.2d 800, 5 OIL AND
Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, -Okla.-,
"Choctaw
GAS REP. 1226 (1956).
"'Col-Tex. Refining Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 150 Tex. 340, 240 S.W.2d 747 (1951).

1957]

COMMENTS

market demand. The converse is true where the producer takes more
than he forecasts. The adjusted forecasts of all the producers in the
field are then added to arrive at the field-wide market demand. The
market demand as then determined is divided ratably among the
wells in that field as allowables.
Balancing periods of six months are generally used. If a well is
underproduced during a balancing period the underage is carried
forward into the next succeeding balancing period as additional
allowable. However, the wells cannot be produced in excess of twice
their normal allowable or in excess of 25 % of open flow. Also, the
underproduction carried forward into a new balancing period may
consist only of the actual underproduction that accrued in the immediately preceding balancing period. All other underproduction is
cancelled.
If a well is overproduced during one balancing period it should
be balanced during the next period, for if a well is overproduced
during two successive balancing periods, it is shut in (except to the
extent necessary to prevent material damage to the well or loss of
the lease) until the overproduction is made up.
These balancing periods are used to give some flexibility to the
setting of allowables and to give the producers and purchasers a
chance to balance their over- and underproduction without the Commission's having to step in and cancel allowables or shut in wells.
With this background in mind the recent field orders will now be
discussed.
Waskoin Field Order:" Four pipeline purchasers and a number
of wells producing from different horizons were involved. The producers had been in the habit of filing exaggerated producer's forecasts which created misleading market requirements and resulted in
unrealistic allowables. The order provides that in the future determination of market demand the Commission would consider in
addition to producers' forecasts " . . . all other factors which the
Commission deems pertinent .... " The balancing period provisions,
cancellation of underages after two periods, and the shutting in
of overproduced wells after two successive balancing periods are
carried forward. The Commission promulgated the new order so
that it could determine actual market demand and assign realistic
allowables which would result in a more ratable taking from the
field.
23,

"'Oil and Gas Docket No. 146, No. 6-32,647, Railroad Comm'n of Texas, December
1955.
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Alco-Mag Field Order:" This field had ten wells; five wells had
pipeline connections, the other five did not. The latter were waiting
to connect to a second pipeline purchaser. Use of the usual method
of determining allowables resulted in gradually decreasing well allowables which were less than the market available. The order revised the field rules to maintain the field allowable at market demand level by the Commission's determination of market demand
* . . . on basis of all pertinent factors . . . " rather than merely on
the basis of producers' forecasts. It should be noted that the field
allowable will continue to be divided among all wells, whether or
not connected to pipelines, in order that the connected wells may
produce only their ratable share of the field allowable based on actual
market demand. The underproduction of the unconnected wells
will continue to be cancelled at the end of the second balancing
period.
Henze Field Order:4 Here there were several producers and a
single purchaser. The producers had been filing exaggerated forecasts, resulting in underproduction of certain wells which was cancelled under the standard balancing formula. Applicant sought to
have the cancelled underproduction reinstated. The Commission refused to reinstate such underproduction and revised the field rules
to eliminate producers' forecasts. It substituted a table showing the
percentage of field production due each well which was to be applied
after production to determine each well's allowable. The order provides that underproduction will be cancelled at the second balancing date and that wells which are overproduced for two successive
balancing periods shall be shut in. The order further provides that
purchasers whose source wells are shut in must make arrangements
to take their market demand from the underproduced wells and
that producers whose source wells are underproduced must allow
any other purchaser to connect with such wells and purchase therefrom until the underproduction is eliminated.
Blue Basin Field Order:4" A twelve well field having two interstate pipeline purchasers was involved. The order follows the Henze
order in its provision for a retrospective, rather than a prospective,
setting of allowables. Market demand is determined for each period
by the actual production during that period rather than by producers' forecasts. Then the actual market demand is divided up
among the wells according to a table of percentages of field produc44

OIL AND GAs REP. 423 (Tex. Railroad Comm'n 1955).
OIL AND GAs REP. 1846 (Tex. Railroad Comm'n 1955).

'65

OIL AND GAs REP. 1100

"

5

(Tex. Railroad Comrn'n 1956).
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tion due each well. Normal provisions in regard to overages and
underages are included. The order also requires that interstate purchasers from overproduced wells shut them in and take from underproduced wells. It provides that purchasers from underproduced
wells (even though they be dedicated reserves) allow other purchasers to make connection with such wells and to take from them
until the underages are made up.
Spider Field Order:47 This is a Louisiana order involving a field
with several wells but only one purchaser. The allowables had been
set on the basis of market demand nominations for the entire field
filed by the single purchaser. During one month the purchaser's
market partially failed, and he did not take ratably. The field rules
have now been revised to require the purchaser to take ratably from
all the wells in the field in the proportion that the individual allowable for each well bears to the total pool allowable.

Puckett (Ellenburger) Field Order:4" Two producers were involved; one owned thirteen wells and had a favorable contract with
the purchaser while the other owned only one well and had an unfavorable contract which resulted in his not being allowed to produce its ratable share. The only purchaser was an interstate pipeline
transporter that owned certain treating facilities which were necessary to make the gas merchantable. This order revised the field rules
so that there is a retrospective or "after the fact" calculation of
allowables similar to that in the Henze and Blue Basin Field Orders,
supra. However, this order does not include a provision requiring
connections between purchasers, probably because there were no immediate prospects for more than the one purchasr. The order declares the interstate pipeline to be a Common Purchaser and orders
it to purchase ratably from the producers in accordance with a
schedule of allowables; the order further requires the pipeline to
furnish all facilities furnished by it for one producer to all other
producers, including the gas treatment facilities.
Suit was filed in the Texas District Court for Travis County attacking this order on the ground that the Railroad Commission exceeded its authority and that the order was illegal, erroneous, and
void. Among the reasons assigned for such alleged illegality were
(a) that the method of assigning allowed production to individual
wells is contrary to statutory requirements [retrospective rather than
prospective proration] and (b) that the Commission does not have
the power to declare the purchaser to also be a common "processor"
474 OIL AND GAs REP. 1851
486 OIL AND GAs REP. -

(La. Dept. of Conservation 1955).

(Tex. Railroad Comm'n 1956).
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of gas. The district court held the order illegal;"9 the Commission
has appealed, and the case has begun its journey through the appellate
courts. Those interested in proration and ratable take will be well
advised to watch its progress; the way it is handled may be of vast
importance in the further development and administration of ratable
take programs.
CONCLUSIONS

In this interesting, yet technical, area of governmental regulation
of oil and gas production there are a number of important problems
to which final answers have not yet been resolved. The very definition of "ratable take" is vague, and it varies from state to state. The
definition, of course, determines what allocation factors the regulating body will consider in setting prorated allowables. There is a
potential conflict between the states' control over production and
the Federal Power Commission's requirement of dedicated gas reserves for interstate pipeline transporters. State agencies are at present requiring purchasers from underproduced wells to give connections to other purchasers and are considering gas swapping requirements. Both these methods of regulation conflict with the dedicated reserve requirement, but as yet there are no cases giving any
authoritative answer to this problem. Then too, especially in Texas,
there is a question as to whether the Railroad Commission has power
to order retrospective, as well as prospective, proration. However,
this appears to be a problem of statutory construction rather than
constitutional law.
All in all, it seems that the law on this subject up to the present
has laid the foundation for ratable take. We shall have to wait and
watch in order to learn the answers to these and other interesting
problems which will be raised as effective programs of ratable take
are developed.'"
Charles Robert Dickenson

"°Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Comm'n (No. 105615, District Court of Travis
County, Texas 1957); and Permian Basin Pipline Co. v. Railroad Comm'n (No. 105696,
District Court of Travis County, Texas, 1957). These cases are reported at 6 OIL AND
GAS REP. 1409.
s Kelley, PRORATION AND RATABLE TAKE, 19 Texas B. J. 763 (1956).

